Title:Long v. Rubin – White IRS Employee’s Files Race Discr. Suit
Posted on: Thu Oct 02 16:39:34 1997ç
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS WESTERN DIVISION PAULA CORBIN JONES Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION : NO. 94-290
v. WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED and DANNY FERGUSON Defendants.
Plaintiff Paula Corbin Jones, by counsel, brings this action to obtain
redress for the deprivation and conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of her
federally protected rights as hereafter alleged, and for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and for defamation.
STATE OF GEORGIA
CHATHAM COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
WALTER J. WOZNIAK,
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.:
TIDELANDS COMMUNITY SERVICE
BOARD and THOMAS BROOME, IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,
CAMERON W. SEAY, )
v. ) DOCKET NUMBER
DEPARTMENT OF )
COUNTY OF FULTON
CAMERON W. SEAY, being duly sworn and deposed, hereby states as follows:
DeKalb County Superior Court
LABOR LAW: Wrongful Termination
Georgia Housing & Finance Authority
Case No. 93-CV-11023,
Feb. 27, 1995
Attorneys: Adam Conti (Wimberly & Lawson), Atlanta, for plaintiff.
Jeff Milsteen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Atlanta, for defendants.
A DeKalb County jury believed that a state employee was fired because he voiced his concerns over possible improper raises within the organization where he had worked for 15 years. The jury awarded him more than $150,000 in back pay and punitive damages.
During 1993, John Dugan was employed by the Georgia Housing & Finance Authority (GHFA). He had worked as the director of finance since 1978. Zack Cravey was the chairman of the board of directors. In March 1993, David Pinson had replaced Terry Duvernay, the former director of GHFA.
Dugan learned in 1993 that certain employees in GHFA had received raises even though the organization was under a salary freeze pursuant to Governor Zell Miller’s orders. More specifically, Dugan discovered that Duvernay had given large salary increases to several employees holding high positions within GHFA. Some of the raises were supposedly accomplished by reclassifying the employees.
Dugan broached this subject with Pinson, the interim director. From April through June of 1993, Dugan on various occasions mentioned to Pinson that the board of directors should be notified of the possible violations of the governor’s orders. Pinson attempted each time to dissuade Dugan from raising the issue, cautioning him that it might not be a wise career move.
However, Dugan was insistent. In mid-June, while Pinson was present, Dugan spoke with Cravey, the chairman of the board, about the improper pay increases. Within two weeks, the board agreed to establish a committee to oversee all future raises within GHFA.
Dugan and Chisenhall, another employee with GHFA, had a problem with Pinson’s use of vulgar, sexually explicit and threatening language. The two claimed that other employees had been on the receiving end of Pinson’s offensive, foul language. Dugan and Chisenhall thus submitted in late June, 1993 a formal, written complaint to the human resources manager, Linda Pryor, regarding Pinson’s use of vulgar and sexually related language in his capacity as interim director of GHFA.
On July 9, 1993, both Chisenhall and Dugan were summarily dismissed. They did not have an opportunity to respond to any charges against them. According to Pinson and GHFA, Dugan was an “at will” employee and thus could be fired at any time. Furthermore, Dugan had a series of performance problems in regard to his response to certain fiscal difficulties.
Dugan filed suit against the GHFA and Pinson individually, arguing that he was improperly fired for exercising his First Amendment right of free speech concerning the improper raises and Pinson’s use of offensive language. He requested back pay based on the compensation level he was receiving at the time he was fired, $76,683 per year. In addition, Dugan sought recovery of his employment benefits, out-of-pocket expenses, costs, attorneys fees and $100,000 in compensatory damages pursuant to U.S.C. section 1981.
At trial, Dugan and Chisenhall both testified regarding Pinson’s foul language and his use of threats against other employees. Chisenhall stated that he was threatened by Pinson as well. Another employee, Carrie Mylum, testified that she was threatened and verbally abused by Pinson. Dugan also called Pinson’s secretary, Phyllis Thomas, who testified that at one point she overheard Pinson say that he was going to get Dugan.
The court directed a verdict in favor of the GHFA and Pinson regarding Pinson’s actions concerning the formal complaint Dugan and Chisenhall submitted to Pryor.
As for the issue of Dugan’s job performance, Dugan testified on his own behalf and Pinson spoke in regards to Dugan’s failure to perform properly and to keep up with the changing times. Judy Anderson, a member of the board of directors, was called by Pinson. According to Anderson, Pinson had broached the subject of Dugan’s performance and his dismissal with her and the board. Anderson stated that Pinson’s decision to let Dugan go was agreed to by the board.
Judge Robert P. Mallis presided over the five-day trial. The jury deliberated for over six hours. They concluded that Dugan was indeed fired for exercising his First Amendment rights and that Pinson would not have fired Dugan but for Dugan’s actions in expressing himself.They awarded him back pay of $120,740 and punitive damages of $30,000
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY
and DOES 1 through 20, Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Plaintiff alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Breach of contract as to Post-Termination Payments — Against All Defendants)
1. Plaintiff is a motion picture and television executive and resident of Los Angeles County. Defendant The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) is a Delaware corporation doing business in Los Angeles County and throughout the world as a motion picture and television production and distribution company, a theme park owner and operator and the proprietor of other businesses.
2. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of the defendants named herein as Does 1 through 20 are unknown to plaintiff, who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names, and plaintiff will amend this complaint to show their true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained.
3. In or about October, 1984, Katzenberg entered into the employ of Disney as Chairman of The Walt Disney Studios, a division of Disney, pursuant to a six-year contract (the “1984 Contract”). By the terms of the 1984 Contract, Katzenberg was given the responsibility to supervise and direct worldwide production, maketing and distribution of all Disney’s live action and animated motion pictures and television programs (“Product”). A key element of Katzenberg’s compensation under the 1984 Contract was an Incentive Bonus provision designed to compensate him to the extent he was able to achieve success in managing the Disney operations that were placed under his direction. The Incentive Bonus provision provided for payment to Katzenberg by Disney of 2% of the gross receipts less cost as defined by the contract (“Profits”) derived by Disney from all Product as defined by the contract put into production or acquired for distribution during the term of his employment (“1984 Eligible Product”). As provided by the 1984 Contract, payment of the 2% Incentive Bonus with respect to Profits earned from the exploitation by Disney of 1984 Eligible product subsequent to expiration of the term of employment would continue to be paid to Katzenberg pursuant to procedures provided for in the 1984 Contract.
4. In 1988, prior to expiration of the term of the 1984 Contract, Disney solicited Katzenberg to enter into a new long-term written employment contract and Disney and Katzenberg thereafter entered into such a written employment contract subscribed by Disney and Katzenberg as of October 1, 1988 (the “1988 Contract”). The term of the 1988 Contract was six years, expiring September 30, 1994, subject to renewal, on the assent of both parties, for an additional two years, expiring September 30, 1996. The 1988 Contract provided for Katzenberg to continue to be employed as Chairman of The Walt Disney Studios and to continue the broad responsibilities he had been performing under the 1984 Contract.
5. Once again, a key element of Katzenberg’s compensation under the 1988 Contract was an Incentive Bonus provision providing for payment to Katzenberg by Disney of 2% of Disney’s Profits from Product put into production or acquired for distribution during Katzenberg’s employment under either the 1988 Contract or the 1984 Contract (“Eligible Product”). Once again, the 1988 contract provided for payment of such 2% Incentive Bonus subsequent to the end of the term of the contract with respect to Profits earned by Disney after the term of the contract derived from Product that had been put into production or acquired for distribution during Katzenberg’s employment going back to October of 1984.
6. In the entertainment industry, revenues from live action and animated feature films and television programming often lag by many years, even decades, after the efforts and expenditures that are incurred to produce such products. For example, because of the lengthy time period that can elapse between commencement of production of an animated film, such as those for which Disney is note, and distribution of the film, the first revenues from the film may not be received until years after production commences. Notable films can continue to generate large revenues for decades thereafter, either by way of theatrical re-release or in other media such as the sale of videotapes. By way of example, in 1994, Disney’s video re-release of “Snow White,” an animated feature first released over fifty years earlier, generated gross revenues of some $800 million and profits of over $500 million. Likewise, successful television shows can realize large syndication revenues years or even decade after production commenced.
7. For this reason, continued payment of the 2% Incentive Bonus with respect to Profits realized by Disney after the end of the term of Katzenberg’s employment from the exploitation of Product put into production or acquired as a result of his efforts during the term of his employment (“Post-Termination Payments”) was of the essence of the agreements between Katzenberg and Disney.
8. The 1988 contract provided for such Post-Termination Payments to be made in the following manner: (a) For each of the two fiscal years occurring subsequent to termination of Katzenberg’s employment, Disney was required to pay the Incentive Bonus calculated as 2% of Profits from Eligible Product earned in that fiscal year. 1.2 % of such Profits was to be paid within three months after the end of the fiscal year and the remaining .8% was to be paid (with interest) in 16 quarterly installments thereafter commencing within six months after the end of the fiscal year. Disney’s fiscal years run from October 1 to September 30. The 1988 Contract employment term expired on September 30, 1994 unless extended to September 30, 1996. (b) With respect to all years thereafter–i.e., the decades during which Disney would continue to earn Profits from Eligible Product put into production or acquired during Katzenberg’s employment–an estimate of future profits from eligible Product was to be established on the second anniversary of the termination of the 1988 Contract. Disney was then required promptly to pay to Katzenberg in a lump-sum the net present value of 2% of that estimated future amount.
9. Katzenberg’s tenure as head of The Walt Disney Studios–Disney’s Filmed Entertainment Division–was one of unparalleled success. For fiscal 1984–the year prior to Katzenberg’s assuming his responsibilities–Disney’s Filmed Entertainment Division generated gross revenues of only $244.5 million and had an operating income of only $2.2 million. For fiscal 1994, the final year of Katzenberg’s tenure as head of the division, gross revenues were some $4.8 billion, with operating income of over $850 million. Throughout his tenure, both gross revenues and operating income increased, without exception, each year. Moreover, the profit levels achieved by Katzenberg as head of the Filmed Entertainment Division became the driving force for Disney’s overall growth in profitability. While, historically, revenue and profits of the Theme Park division had dwarfed those of the Filmed Entertainment division, by the end of Katzenberg’s tenure both gross revenues and operating income of the Filmed Entertainment division far outstripped those of the Theme Parks. The following chart, the numbers of which are derived from Disney’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, shows the comparative results of Filmed Entertainment and Theme Parks for the ten fiscal years–1985-1994–that Katzenberg headed Filmed Entertainment.
DISNEY REVENUE AND INCOME: 1985-1994 (in millions)
Theme Parks……….Revenue…………Operating Income
1994…………….. 3,463.6…………684.1Filmed Entertainment
10. Pursuant to the terms of the 1988 Contract, Katzenberg was entitled to give one year’s advance notice, in September 1993, that the 1988 Contract would expire as scheduled on September 30, 1994 and would not be renewed until September 30, 1996. In September 1993, Katzenberg gave Disney such notice. On September 30, 1994, the term of the 1988 Contract expired and Katzenberg’s employment by Disney ended.
11. Katzenberg has done all things that have been required to be done by him under the 1988 Contract and he is in no manner or respect in breach thereof. At the time of Disney’s acts of breach and repudiation hereinafter set forth, the 1988 Contract, but for Disney’s breach, continued to impose obligations of performance upon Katzenberg.
12. Disney has committed the following acts of breach and repudiation of the 1988 Contract: Disney has repeatedly claimed that it has no obligation to make _any_ Post-Termination Payments to Katzenberg, thereby repudiating its said obligation. Thereafter, despite repeated demand by and on behalf of Katzenberg, Disney for over a year has refused to acknowledge its contractual obligation to make such Post- Termination Payments. Additionally, the first of Disney’s fiscal years occurring subsequent to termination of Katzenberg’s employment ended on September 30, 1995; Disney has failed and refused within three months of that date to make any Post-Termination Payment to Katzenberg for such fiscal year or to furnish any calculation to Katzenberg of the amount of any Post-Termination Payment for such fiscal year.
13. As a direct and proximate result of Disney’s breach and repudiation of the 1988 Contract, Katzenberg has suffered and will suffer substantial monetary damage in a sum not presently susceptible to precise calculation. The Profits expected to be received by Disney with respect to those Products put into production or acquired for distribution during the term of Katzenberg’s employment have a net present value believed to be well in excess of $12.5 billion. Katzenberg is informed and believes and, on that ground, alleges that he has suffered monetary damages in a sum which will exceed $250 million. As a result of Disney’s bad faith conduct, Katzenberg has incurred and will incur substantial attorneys’ fees.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Breach of Contract as to Pre-Termination Payments — Against All Defendants)
14. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 13 hereinabove as though fully set forth herein.
15. Both the 1984 Contract and the 1988 Contract required Disney to provide Katzenberg with supporting documentation and information enabling him to verify the accuracy of Disney’s calculations or estimations of sums payable to him with respect to his Incentive Bonus.
16. Despite a reasonable request by Katzenberg for the supporting documentation and information enabling him to verify the accuracy of Disney’s calculations or estimations in respect of his Incentive Bonus payable to him prior to termination, Disney has refused to provide any such documentation and information.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1. For damages in the sum of $250 million or such greater sum as shall be found to have been caused by Disney’s breach and repudiation;
2. For prejudgment interest at the highest lawful rate;
3. For plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5;
4. For an order requiring defendants to produce supporting documentation and information necessary to verify the accuracy of any calculations or estimations of plaintiff’s Incentive Bonus; and
5. For costs of suit and such other relief as the court shall deem proper.
DATED: April 9, 1996
By /S/ BERTRAM FIELDS
BERTRAM FIELDS, CHARLES N. SHEPHARD, KEVIN L. JAMES
GREENBERG, GLUSKER, FIELDS, CLAMAN & MACHTINGER
1900 Avenue of the Stars,
Suite 2200 Los Angeles, California 90067-4590
HERBERT M. WACHTELL,
THEODORE N. MIRVIS,
EDWARD A. STELZER
WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
51 West 52nd Street
New York, New York
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jeffrey Katzenberg
CAMERON W. SEAY, )
v. ) DOCKET NUMBER
DEPARTMENT OF )
Pursuant to the February 24, 1997 Acknowledgment Order in this case, Appellant submits the following argument and evidence establishing why the Board has jurisdiction over his appeal. A copy of Appellant’s Affidavit explaining the factual circumstances giving rise to his appeal is attached.
STATE OF GEORGIA
DEKALB COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
JOHN P. DUGAN,
Civil Action File No.. 93-CV-11023,
GEORGIA HOUSING AND
AND DAVID B. PINSON IN
HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,
Plaintiff John P. Dugan resides in Marietta, Georgia and is subject to the jurisdiction of this court.
Defendant Georgia Housing and Finance Authority (GHFA) is an instrumentality of the State of Georgia existing by virtue of Chapter 26, Title 50, O.C.G.A.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 50-26-8(a)(2)(1) the GHFA is subject to suit in contract and tort.
The GHFA has offices located in DeKalb County at 60 Executive Park South, NE, Suite 250, Atlanta, Georgia 30329. It may be served personally at that location in care of David B. Pinson, its Acting Executive Director.
Defendant David B. Pinson has, at all times on and after February 6, 1993 held the position of Acting Executive Director of GHFA. He resides in DeKalb County at 897 Highland View, NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30306. He may be served personally at his residence or at his office, 60 Executive Park South, NE, Suite 250, Atlanta, Georgia 30329.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This action is brought pursuant to O.C.G.A. §45-1-4 which grants a public employee the right to initiate a proceeding in Superior Court to set aside actions taken in violation of that section. Plaintiff is also alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Georgia.
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-10-30 venue is proper in the DeKalb County Superior Court as Defendant GHFA is headquartered within the geographical boundaries of that Court and equitable relief is sought against that Defendant.
From August 14, 1978 until July 9, 1993 Plaintiff held the position of Finance Director of GHFA and its predecessor agency, the Georgia Residential Finance Authority.
While employed as GHFA Finance Director Plaintiff performed his duties in an exemplary manner such that throughout his tenure the financial strength and health of the GHFA continually improved culminating in Standard and Poor’s recognition of it in 1992 as a Top Tier Agency, an honor given only to twelve agencies in the country.
As Finance Director Plaintiff was the Chief Financial Officer of GHFA. Plaintiff was therefore under a professional and ethical duty to ensure that the highest standards of financial propriety were observed at all times by all personnel within the GHFA. This duty extended to his obligation to report suspected improprieties directly to the Board of Directors and to take action to minimize GHFA’s potential liability.
Since July 1991 and continuing through the date of Plaintiff’s termination, the government of the State of Georgia and the GHFA were under a hiring and salary freeze. During this period, the GHFA Finance Department operated with an extreme staff shortage, its personnel received no salary increases in fiscal year 1992 and salary increases for fiscal year 1993 were capped at 2-1/2% or $1,000.00
In early 1992 a “reorganization” of the GHFA took place under then Executive Director Terry Duvernay. As a result of this “reorganization” several employees of Duvernay’s staff received reclassifications that in effect raised their salaries far in excess of the guidelines of the freeze. For example, the Personnel Director, Linda Pryor, received a 15% raise; the internal auditor received a 12% raise; the Executive Counsel received a 9% raise and the Assistant Counsel received a 14% raise.
In the summer of 1992 the GHFA gave the daughter of Hank Huckaby, a previous director of the GHFA and ex-officio member of the GHFA Board of Directors, special consideration as an applicant for employment with the GHFA by granting her a job interview when no interviews were granted to approximately 150 other applicants.
In early 1993 Plaintiff reviewed a record of all salary increases in the GHFA for the prior two years. This review found that there was a concentration of questionable raises among employees in the Executive Department which had been headed by Duvernay. Appellant suspected that the Executive Director had been rewarding his staff by secretly granting them pay increases in violation of both the freeze and his public statements that no exceptions to the freeze would be permitted.
On or about April 15, 1993 when Plaintiff suggested in a Senior Staff meeting that department heads be permitted to raise concerns directly with the Board, Mr. Pinson reminded Plaintiff that the last person to bypass the Executive Director had been terminated.
Several days later Plaintiff mentioned to Mr. Mr. Pinson that he had a concern with payroll that he wished to discuss with the Board Chairman. Mr. Pinson responded by advising Plaintiff that Mr. Pinson desired the Executive Director job on a permanent basis and that if any of his managers raised any concerns with the Board that jeopardized Mr. Pinson’s appointment, Mr. Pinson may take action against him.
In mid-June, 1993 Plaintiff advised Mr. Pinson of his concerns regarding the raises that had been given to Executive Department employees during Duvernay’s tenure as Executive Director. Plaintiff suggested that he and Mr. Pinson raise this issue with the Board Chairman, Zack Cravey. Mr. Pinson advised Plaintiff that doing so might jeopardize Plaintiff’s career.
On or about June 16, 1993 Plaintiff in Mr. Pinson’s presence met with Board Chairman Cravey and advised him of the raises and Plaintiff’s concerns that they had been made in violation of the freeze.
On or about June 24, the Board appointed a committee to oversee all future raises as a direct result of Plaintiff’s concerns.
On a regular and recurring basis from the time he was first hired in 1990, until the date of Plaintiff’s discharge, including the time he was Acting Executive Director, Mr. Pinson frequently made vulgar and sexually related remarks to employees of GHFA. On or about June 28, 1993 Plaintiff and Wayne Chisenhall, who had been Controller of the GHFA since December of 1989, gave a letter concerning Mr. Pinson’s conduct to Linda Pryor the Human Resources Manager of GHFA. A true and accurate copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
On Friday, July 9, Plaintiff and Mr. Chisenhall, were summarily discharged by Mr. Pinson who refused to provide Plaintiff with a reason for the discharge. A copy of the letter advising Plaintiff of his discharge is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
Plaintiff was not given advance notice of the discharge decision, any opportunity to respond prior to his separation, or any hearing on the decision to terminate his employment. The Board members refused to even speak with Plaintiff after discharge.
The conduct of Defendants as set forth above demonstrates malice, wantonness, willfulness, evil motive or intent and reckless or callous indifference to the protected rights of Plaintiff.
As a result of Plaintiff’s discharge, he has been deprived of his livelihood, subjected to great humiliation and mental anguish and subjected to other damages.
IV. COUNT ONE
VIOLATION OF O.C.G.A §45-1-4
Plaintiff’s complaints to the GHFA Board of Directors concerning the extraordinary raises given to members of Mr. Duvernay’s staff and his letter of June 28 constituted complaints or information protected by O.C.G.A §45-1-4.
Plaintiff’s discharge was taken as a reprisal for making a complaint or disclosing information to his Employer in violation of O.C.G.A §45-1-4(d).
42 U.S.C. §1983 VIOLATION
Paragraphs one through twenty-six are incorporated by reference as if set forth directly herein.
Plaintiff’s communications to the Board Chairman regarding the propriety of the raises given the Executive Director’s staff under Mr. Duvernay’s terms and Plaintiff’s complaint to Ms. Pryor regarding Mr. Pinson’s offensive and inappropriate conduct constituted free speech on matters of concern to the public which were protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
Plaintiff’s complaints to the Board Chairman concerning the pay raises and his complaint to Human Resource Director Pryor concerning Mr. Pinson’s conduct constituted petitions to the government for the redress of grievances protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
Plaintiff was discharged by the GHFA as a result of his exercise of the First Amendment rights described above in Paragraphs twenty-eight and twenty-nine.
Plaintiff’s discharge for the exercise of constitutional rights violates 42 U.S.C. §1983 in that it constitutes a deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution by persons acting under color of State law.
INFRINGEMENT OF LIBERTY INTEREST
Paragraphs one through thirty-one are hereby incorporated by reference as if set forth directly herein.
Subsequent to Plaintiff’s termination, at least one member of the GHFA Board has stated to a third party that Plaintiff was discharged for an incident of improper personal conduct, for having become withdrawn and because Plaintiff had incorrectly reported to the Board on the financial projections for the year ending June 30.
Since the foregoing statements and the manner in which Plaintiff was terminated are stigmatizing and false, they significantly foreclose Plaintiff’s possibility of future employment in his chosen field.
The manner in which Plaintiff was terminated and statements made by agents of Defendant GHFA concerning his termination infringed upon Plaintiff’s liberty interest in his employment as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Paragraphs one through thirty-five are hereby realleged as if set forth directly.
Because Plaintiff was terminated based upon grounds which violated the Constitution and because Plaintiff’s termination infringed upon his liberty interest, Plaintiff was entitled to a hearing to accord him an opportunity to address the charges against him.
GHFA’s failure to grant him such a hearing violated Plaintiff’s right to procedural due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
VIOLATION OF THE GEORGIA CONSTITUTION
Paragraphs one through thirty-eight are hereby realleged as if set forth herein.
The manner in which Plaintiff was discharged violated his rights to free speech and his right to petition the government for redress of grievances protected by the Article 1, §1, Paragraphs 4 and 9, respectively of the Constitution of the State of Georgia.
The manner in which Plaintiff was discharged and his treatment by the GHFA prior to his discharge violated his right to equal protection of the law guaranteed by Article 1, §1, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the State of Georgia.
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Paragraphs one through forth-one are hereby realleged as if set forth herein.
As Acting Executive Director of the GHFA Mr. Pinson did not have absolute authority to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.
In recommending Plaintiff’s employment be terminated Defendant Mr. Pinson acted from improper motives.
Mr. Pinson is liable to Plaintiff for the termination of his employment and the damages resulting therefrom because Mr. Pinson has tortiously interfered with Plaintiff’s employment with the Authority.
LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT PINSON FOR BREACH OF PLAINTIFF’S
Paragraphs one through forty-five are hereby realleged as if set forth herein.
The constitutional rights of Plaintiff as enumerated above in Counts Two through Four were clearly established at the time of his discharge.
Defendant Pinson in his individual capacity either actually knew, or in the exercise of his duties should have known, of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Defendant Pinson in his individual capacity is therefore liable to Plaintiff for breach of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands that a trial by Jury be had on all Counts and that following such trial judgment be entered on Plaintiff’s behalf against Defendant GHFA granting the following relief:
- Cancellation of Plaintiff’s termination;
- Reinstatement of Plaintiff with back pay and such benefits as Plaintiff would have enjoyed had he never been separated;
- If reinstatement is impossible under the circumstances, GHFA be ordered to grant Plaintiff front pay until the Plaintiff reaches age sixty-five;
- Full and fair monetary damages in an amount to be proven at trial to compensate Plaintiff for the mental anguish, humiliation, pain and suffering and such other damages as resulted from the improper conduct of Defendant GHFA;
- Plaintiff’s costs of this action including reasonable attorney’s fees;
- Such punitive damages as are determined by the enlightened conscience of an impartial Jury are warranted to deter Defendant from future conduct of the type proven at trial;
- Such further and additional relief as the Court may deem is appropriate.
Furthermore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment against Defendant David B. Pinson as follows:
- Damages in the amount of the compensation and value of benefits Plaintiff would have received had he continued in employment and not been terminated on July 9, 1993 with pre-judgment interest and full compensation for such benefits as Plaintiff lost;
- Full and fair monetary damages in an amount to be proven at trial to compensate Plaintiff for the mental anguish, humiliation, pain and suffering, and such other damages as he resulted from the improper conduct of Defendant Pinson;
- Plaintiff’s cost of this action including Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney’s fees;
- Such punitive damages as are determined by the enlightened conscience of an impartial Jury are warranted to deter Defendant from future conduct of the type proven at trial;
- Such further and additional relief as the Court may deem appropriate.
Respectfully submitted this ______ day of ________, 1993.
ADAM J. CONTI
GEORGIA BAR NUMBER 182475
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
Davis v. Espy
From January 13 through January 15, 1997 I tried the case of Joan P.Davis v. David Espy, Secretary, U.S.Dept of Agriculture, before an eight member jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Judge Marvin H. Shoob presided. James R. Schultz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, represented the Government. The jury returned a verdict against Ms. Davis.
After exhausting administrative remedies under the federal sector eeo procedures, we filed suit on Ms. Davis’ claims in November 1993. Because of the procedure in the Northern District of Georgia, we had previously conducted a non jury trial of the case before Magistrate Judge John R. Strother, Jr. in February 1996. In mid 1996 Magistrate Strother issued a Report and Findings recommending no finding of discrimination.